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‘‘Theatre in the ‘Engaged University’:  A Context for 
Habermas’s Communicative Action”
Anne Berkeley 
Throughout its history, the American university has learned to accommodate 
divergent functions—theological, humanistic, vocational, and scholarly, for 
example—that have been organized into curricula, and legitimized on the basis 
of changing ideas about the uses of knowledge. The growth of theatre studies has 
been complex and multifaceted but, in the end, its generalizable characteristics 
can be understood to fall into two prevailing curricular orientations. The ﬁrst, 
an aesthetically-oriented curriculum, teaches the values of the liberal humanist 
approach. The second, a market-oriented curriculum, is characterized by 
professionalism and vocationalism. These formulations mark the triumph of 
“Enlightened” objectivity that has afﬂicted our practices with discordant beliefs 
about whether to teach humanistic content or the crafts of theatrical production. 
In the 1930s, this debate came to be identiﬁed as a dichotomy between “craft” or 
“culture.”1
The ﬁeld has never resolved this clash and is still mired in disagreements about 
whether to emphasize intellectual growth or technical skills, or whether and how 
to do both. Currently, liberal arts education embraces a market-oriented, utilitarian 
aim as students’ intentions for the bachelor of arts (B.A.) degree have changed 
from developing a philosophy of life to that of preparing for economic security.2 
This trend is especially troubling for theatre studies because it raises questions 
about the ethics of professional training for a labor market with so few careers. All 
too often now an entrenched dichotomy frustrates efforts to teach a theoretically 
coherent curriculum. Both foundations of the theatre curriculum—the liberal arts 
and the pre-professional—have been exhausted. Programs are notoriously disjointed 
and dysfunctional, quagmires of turf battles, ideological discrepancies, and ﬁscal 
scarcity. So in its 200 year struggle for recognition worthy of its potential in liberal 
arts education, theatre’s disciplinary potency and integration with larger university 
concerns remain illusive. 
The ﬁeld often suffers, in sum, from a crisis of legitimacy. But educational 
dispensations are neither monolithic nor neutral, not intransigent but malleable. 
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Historian of higher education Herbert Kliebard shows that disciplinary histories 
reﬂect, above all, struggles for legitimacy within arenas of shifting and contested 
ideas about the purpose of a university education. The undergraduate curriculum 
is therefore shaped by competing agendas for curricular content, with attempts 
to reform it necessarily bound by comprehensive academic agendas.3 So we can 
surmise that theatre studies will be legitimized to the degree that it appeals to the 
university’s deﬁning interests. The rescue of theatre programs depends, I think, 
on scholars’ and teachers’ willingness to understand temporal constructions of 
knowledge in higher education and to link the ﬁeld actively to their formulations. 
For unless the discipline vigorously participates in the university’s discourses, it 
can expect little control over its own affairs. 
I want to propose here a coherent approach for undergraduate, liberal arts 
theatre studies that, ﬁrst, repairs the aesthetic versus vocational impasse and, 
second, legitimizes the ﬁeld on the basis of current formulations of knowledge that 
tilt toward reﬂexive praxis—that is, of simultaneously understanding and acting 
upon the world.4 In this attempt, I put forth a theory that brings into focus a more 
contextualized, communicative picture of knowledge grounded in a current version 
of higher education, that of the “engaged university”—a model that advocates its 
public, communitarian mission and replaces the traditional bifurcation of applied 
and basic research with a commitment to praxis. 
The concept of an engaged curriculum inevitably alters our traditional view of 
the liberal arts, with their disinterested, context-independent theory of knowledge—
that is, a production of knowledge divested of personal and ideological prejudices 
and interests—and their separation from more useful or applied forms of inquiry.5 
An engaged theatre curriculum, on the other hand, would shift its interest from 
the formalist study of aesthetics and the crafts of theatre production in the manner 
of the traditional, bifurcated notion of artes liberales, to an exploration of the art 
of theatre as a channel for participation in public life. Gaining full membership 
in the academy will then correspond to the institutional and rhetorical force of its 
contribution to new models of liberal education. This expectation, I will show, 
would change current priorities in our teaching. 
Toward this aim, I will begin by historicizing our predicament in the academy as 
it has been shaped by changing deﬁnitions of knowledge. Then, I will turn to Jürgen 
Habermas’s critical theories of knowledge constitutive interests, communicative 
action, and discourse ethics to help articulate the character of, and criteria for, a 
more critical form of aesthetic pedagogy that promotes public, civic engagement. As 
we shall see, Habermas’s interest in strengthening a communicative and dialectical 
epistemology within social institutions is especially well-suited to the collaborative 
and public nature of theatre arts. These concerns would also accommodate a concrete 
engagement with the practical world that intertwines theory and action, life and art, 
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in promoting theatre’s capacity for democratic dialogue. Finally, I will propose a 
curricular praxis in the context of the engaged university.
Theatre Studies in the Modern University 
The theatre curriculum entered higher education in the United States at the 
turn of the twentieth century with the formation of the modern research university, 
fashioned in Berlin by Wilhelm von Humboldt in the early nineteenth century. 
Humboldt developed a plan for a more utilitarian and practical university that 
would serve Germany’s new status as a nation-state. Facing debilitating social 
problems associated with industrialism, and seeking strategies and mechanisms 
to manage an ever more complex society, American educationists traveled to 
Germany after 1865 to study Humboldt’s plan. They returned to advance a theory of 
educational usefulness by way of the new sciences (chemistry, biology, medicine), 
and introduced modern tools of scientiﬁc research.6 
Subsequently, historians have argued, the conﬂuence of economic, political, 
and educational forces that consolidated the features of the modern university in the 
U.S.—and made possible the introduction of theatre studies—rest on an unresolved 
tension between two visions of knowledge and their various combinations, those 
of humanism, authored in the colonial college, and utilitarianism, derived from 
the Humboldtian ideology.7 In the ﬁrst vision, the academy advances a liberal and 
secular culture, while safeguarding and disseminating a national cultural heritage. 
Formulated to preserve the past and to prepare a leadership of minister-teacher-
scholars (“gentlemen”), the humanists of classical culture advocated general 
(unspecialized) education centered on disciplined, intrinsically valuable inquiry. 
The second vision, that of utilitarianism, fosters development of research-based, 
increasingly technological knowledge, with social and economic payoffs.8 In 
these conditions, scientiﬁc research became synonymous with liberal culture.9 By 
1910, the mandates of research-based knowledge became dominant, leading to 
the expansion and diversiﬁcation of the curriculum, differentiation of the colonial 
college’s general curriculum into discrete disciplines, and departmentalization of 
the academic program.10 Such modern categories of “humanities,” “sciences,” 
and “liberal arts and sciences” came to designate the varied methodologies of 
undergraduate curriculum.
At the intersection of humanism and utilitarianism in the early twentieth century, 
drama entered the academy in language and speech departments.11 The inclusion 
of drama was subsequently drafted according to the university’s dual interests and 
substantiated in competing epistemic dispositions. Drama ﬁrst appeared under the 
aegis of humanism, then reacting against the university’s growing functionalism and 
its pursuit of knowledge within increasingly narrow disciplinary borders. In the ﬁrst 
decade of the twentieth century, the humanists, who saw American culture in steep 
decline, promoted the classics, philosophy, language, and literature—remnants of 
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the classical college—as a way to raise intellect and culture to an idealized vision 
of humanity.12 Drawing inspiration from Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy 
(1869), Irving Babbitt (followed after the First World War by T. S. Eliot and F. R. 
Leavis) countered the crass materialist democratization of industrial society with 
aesthetics (“sweetness and light”).13 Performance techniques and playwriting were 
introduced to teach language and literature. These experiments supported then 
current romantic versions of aesthetic expression as the search for eternal truths 
in the mold of Arnoldian humanism. Invoking a universal dramatic “instinct” or 
“sensibility” as the source of untapped educational potential, teachers constructed 
the prototype of drama teaching in an aesthetically-oriented curriculum.14
In the second decade of the twentieth century, college drama programs in the 
humanist vein began to give public performances outside the classroom in the form 
of “amateur theatricals.” Dramatic study soon gained legitimacy and autonomy. 
Departments of theatre were formed and, leaning toward the utilitarian interest, 
began to add specialized courses to bolster production values in self-consciously 
amateur performances. In this milieu, performance quality began to be measured 
against more professional standards and by the early 1930s, a craft-inﬂected 
curriculum, aimed to prepare students for the semi-professional theatre, gained 
momentum. Circular arguments for production-based curricula were pragmatic: if 
the university produced plays for the public, it should train students to give public 
performances. As one scholar said, “It is the moral duty of the university to provide 
accurate and intelligent basic training.”15 Thus was born the “craft or culture” 
dilemma—whether to emphasize instrumental technical skills or generalized 
intellectual qualities—which played out in an often bitter scholarly debate that 
still persists.16
The so-called “boom time” for higher education, from 1945 through the 
1970s, saw theatre studies’ professionalization in the academy as the number 
of programs offering B.A. degrees, and eventually bachelor of ﬁne arts (B.F.A.) 
degrees, soared. The Directory of American College Theatre (DACT), 1960, 
reported the doubling of undergraduate theatre programs from 1945 through the 
1950s, with most colleges and universities providing curricula, and a quarter of 
them offering a B.A. in theatre arts. After 1960, the number of theatre teachers 
and students tripled, the 1967 DACT reported, and theatre courses grew by 71% 
in an increasingly specialized curriculum.17 The emergence then of a market-
oriented curriculum was literally cemented by a proliﬁc building program in which, 
beginning in the 1950s and continuing for two decades, hundreds of performing arts 
facilities were constructed at universities and colleges across the nation.18 Highly 
trained scenic designers, directors, and technicians were hired, and students trained 
to perform in newly-constructed capacious theatres—designed with the latest 
architectural speciﬁcations—as theatre programs became “producing units.”19 In 
undergraduate theatre education, then, the priorities of liberal culture and general 
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education (humanism) were largely supplanted during the second half by those of 
professionalism (utilitarianism).20 
At the same time, with others in the humanities committed to reconceptualizing 
liberal arts, the culturalists promoted the reinvention of theatre studies. They 
derived from John Dewey, Susanne Langer, and Alfred North Whitehead, for 
example, a basis for probing what they saw as theatre’s untapped experiential and 
aesthetic forms of learning. The interest in Dewey’s pragmatism—“education not 
as preparation for life, but as life”—animated much of the humanists’ conversation. 
Claiming to counter a perceived emphasis on a detached relationship between 
students and subject matter, theatre educators under Dewey’s inﬂuence put forth 
experiential pedagogies—“teaching students rather than subject-matter,” teaching 
theatre as “an educational tool,” and as “process over product”—to fulﬁll this 
vision.21 
Still, the most important development in the undergraduate theatre curriculum 
of the 1960s and 1970s, and continuing in the 1980s, was an entirely different sort of 
pragmatism, that of professionalization. Professionalizing theatre studies included 
its alliance with the growing number of professional regional theatres launched 
during the Kennedy administration. So the experimental, humanist proclivities were 
presented in fundamentally incongruous curricula because instrumental, vocational 
instruction was widely justiﬁed as a form of liberal education.22
As the ﬁrst step to gaining full membership in the academy, we must repair an 
incongruous curriculum that has rigidiﬁed in the dichotomy between the aesthetic 
and market-oriented orientations. Speciﬁcally, I propose that we reconstruct theatre 
studies as a civically-oriented curriculum, contextualized in students’ aesthetic, 
cultural, and social interests. We can move, now, to put forth a theory of aesthetic 
practice promoting theatre’s capacity for democratic dialogue. The formal study of 
production and performance would shift to an exploration of theatre as a channel 
for participation in public life in the spirit of the engaged university. 
Knowledge Constitutive Interests
In this attempt, I move now to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of knowledge and 
human interests in order to establish a perspective from which it is possible to set 
forth principles and values of theatre studies as a civic discourse, out of concern 
for the reﬂexive and experiential nature of theatrical knowledge. Proceeding from 
Aristotle’s categories of knowledge production, Habermas elaborates three human 
interests intrinsic to thought and action—technical, practical, and emancipatory.23 
Because they are related to necessities for survival, Habermas claims, these interests 
constitute “fundamental sciences” by which societies generate and organize 
knowledge. In this epistemology, the technical interest engenders an empirical-
analytical science of knowing; the practical, an historical-hermeneutic; and the 
emancipatory, a critical-cognitive. Motivated by the need to manage and control 
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the environment, the technical interest is the foundation of empirical and analytical 
methods expressed in positive sciences. According to Shirley Grundy, curricula 
guided by a technical interest purport to transfer knowledge and confer skills 
deemed necessary for the student to succeed in managing, or “manipulating,” his 
or her world. The curriculum consists, ﬁrst, of objectives that represent knowledge, 
and, second, of content and methods by which objectives are transmitted to 
learners. Teaching entails the application of procedures mechanized according to 
pre-ordained objectives. In modern Western societies, Grundy claims, Habermas’s 
technical interest has dominated curricular theory and design. Consequently, 
students generally come to understand knowledge as a delivered product—the 
representation of phenomena, organized in an objective world.24
Whereas the technical interest is concerned with products, Habermas continues, 
the practical interest seeks access to facts governed by meaning rather than 
observation. Deliberation, judgment, and meaning-making are central to practical 
action, which concerns a fundamental interest in understanding the environment 
through interaction based upon a consensual interpretation of meaning. In Grundy’s 
view, curriculum as practice, or action, rises from the collaborative deliberation 
and judgment of its participants—teachers and students—whose needs and well-
being it addresses. By accentuating practice over products, a practical curriculum 
is concerned with furthering “the good” of its contributors. Hence, it is justiﬁed 
morally rather than cognitively.25
Because of the tendency, Habermas argues, for persons to be deceived by the 
interests, aims, and rhetorical muscle of the powerful, the practical interest does 
not defend against social coercion. Thus, the emancipatory, or critical, interest 
springs from the impulse of individuals and groups to take control of their lives 
through self reﬂection in responsible and autonomous ways. Habermas speaks 
of critical dialectic where action follows from critical reﬂection. In Grundy’s 
view, a curriculum informed by a critical interest (as with a practical) centralizes 
deliberation and action rather than a product, and reason rather than rule-following. 
Importantly, a curriculum informed by the emancipatory interest speciﬁes a 
setting free of social coercion. Invoking knowledge constitutive interests, Grundy 
formulates curriculum as a critical praxis that extends from “a fundamental interest 
in emancipation and empowerment to engage in autonomous action arising from 
authentic, critical insights into the social construction of human society.”26 
Evaluating theatre studies’ rise in the American academy against Grundy’s 
framework shows that in neither the aesthetic nor market-oriented missions have 
curricula been methodically practiced as means of producing knowledge through 
Habermas’s iteration of the practical and critical interests. At several points 
theatre educators did forge more practical pedagogies that emphasized reﬂective 
participation in society. During the century’s ﬁrst two decades, for example, George 
Pierce Baker, Frederick Koch, and others promoted the design of theatre education 
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as a form of public service and “education for citizenship,” designing courses in 
which students wrote and produced “folk dramas” about life in rural communities.27 
But responding in the 1930s to expanding audiences and the perception of these 
experiments as an unsophisticated theatrical vision, utilitarian arguments for 
technically-oriented instruction in production crafts carried the day.
An important factor in the incremental advance toward professionalism was the 
university’s move after the Second World War toward becoming a national resource 
for training professional artists, erasing an historic dichotomy and hardening the 
market-oriented curriculum that still prevails. The problem with this approach in 
undergraduate education is that students learn to associate professional standards 
with true knowledge of their theatrical and dramatic culture. But in fact, they learn 
a particular knowledge intended to help them maneuver in the world of work while 
domesticating them to the tastes and values of an idealized middle-class audience. 
So the governing technicism in current theatre curricula tacitly emphasizes acritical 
objectives in training, fashioned to the standards of mainstream theatre outside the 
academy. This contradiction lies at the root of the ﬁeld’s current travails.
Like all generalizations, this assessment is itself an oversimpliﬁcation. 
Nothing in the ever-changing landscape of undergraduate education is inevitable, 
and certainly intrepid theatre educators, students, and scholars will always move 
theatre study with exigency, toward new horizons. Since the 1980s, for instance, 
scholarship in performance studies as conceived by Richard Schechner and 
others has repositioned drama and theatre as just one category in a larger ﬁeld 
of performance. This perspective looks at a broad spectrum of performative 
behavior, from artistic activity, explicitly framed as performance (e.g. theater, 
dance, music) to cultural performance (e.g. ritual, communications, social life). 
Interdisciplinary in nature, it explores the intersections of performance and other 
ﬁelds such as anthropology, sociology, folklore, language communication, and 
popular entertainment. By understanding culture as something constituted through 
performance—that is, as an enactment of social life—performance studies has 
transformed critical studies in theatre. 
Still, the ﬁeld appears to be as vulnerable at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century 
as it was when it ﬁrst entered undergraduate education at the start of the twentieth. 
For the university that now accommodates both professional training and critical 
studies seems typically to accept theatre studies ungenerously since it does not 
contribute in an obvious way to either of its major tenets. Consequently, theatre 
departments all too often have little, if any, disciplinary and institutional power. 
The ﬁrst task in revising the curriculum, then, is to provide a theory of knowledge 
that renounces these oppositions in current versions of theatre education. The 
theory cannot be established as a “middle ground” that escapes the shortcomings 
of opposing goals and practices. Instead, it must rescind the institutional patterns 
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that gave rise to the oppositions in the ﬁrst place, and with them, the hierarchies 
of old.
Incorporating Habermas’s practical and critical interests suggests a way to 
legitimate theatre studies’ value in liberal education by promoting its unique capacity 
for democratic dialogue. What is needed now is a theory that would retain some 
of the liberal arts’ traditional concerns—its commitment to ideas and reﬂection, 
questions of human life and meaning, and attention to matters of character, ethics, 
and the development of citizenship. But these concerns would also accommodate 
a concrete engagement with the practical world that is typically associated with 
the applied arts.
Communicative Action and the Public Sphere
To begin articulating such a pedagogy, we can turn now to Habermas’s theory 
of communicative action. To begin, Habermas recalls Max Weber’s analysis of 
modernity. Weber deﬁnes modernity as the splitting of cultural reason into three 
discrete spheres, those of science, morality, and art, which came to be separated 
when the uniﬁed paradigm of religion and metaphysics unraveled.28 By the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Habermas determines, the separation led to 
the formation of three autonomous cultural realms: the cognitive-instrumental, 
moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive. During the nineteenth-century “age of 
progress,” knowledge became fragmented and administered as the contents of 
specialized knowledge to be handed down by professional experts. What accrued 
to culture through specialized treatment and reﬂection, Habermas adds, became 
divorced from the property of everyday life.29 But everyday life depends on the 
interactive relationship of each sphere in order, he says, to safeguard social praxis 
from social coercion. It is the cumulative effects of this rupture that have led, 
Habermas says, to “the crisis of modernity.”30
Throughout his writings, Habermas is concerned with the question of whether or 
not democracy is possible in the context of cultural fragmentation within advanced, 
global capitalism. That he hypothesizes in all his works practices that will strengthen 
this possibility reﬂects a conviction that opportunities for democratic action have not 
yet been exhausted, and that the Enlightenment remains “an unﬁnished project.”31 In 
advanced states, he claims, private interests have overlapped into public arenas, and 
state and social systems have become interlinked. In this situation, private interests 
seeking to inﬂuence the political aims of the state constrain open discussion, and 
citizens are no longer able to participate equally in the political process. Two tasks 
must be undertaken, he concludes, to reintegrate cultural spheres and reconstruct 
democratic action. First, a public sphere that mediates between state and private 
citizens must be reintroduced. A public sphere consists of any space or process in 
which citizens reﬂect upon and make apparent political and administrative decisions 
of the state.32 Second, communicative practices that comprise open civic discourse 
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must be redeveloped. With these recommendations, Habermas lays the groundwork 
for his theory of communicative action.33
The emergence of critique potentiated by cognitive differentiation fatefully 
distinguishes, for Habermas, the secular and modern from traditional religious 
societies. By opening a possibility for interpretation and revision of existing 
conditions, critique constitutes the grounds for a continued commitment to another 
axiomatic principle of the Enlightenment—rationality. Habermas deﬁnes rationality 
as any way that decentered subjects, in possession of an independent and objective 
mind, apply cognition to form judgments. He contends that to understand fully the 
failures of modernity and recognize, as well, its possibilities, it is necessary to inquire 
into the uses of several kinds of rationality, together with the relationship of each to 
the production of knowledge. The crucial concept for Habermas is not rationality as 
such, but that the differentiation of modern consciousness into three worlds elicited 
a diversiﬁcation of rationalities. The attitude of the actor in teleological, or goal-
directed, rationality (cognitive-instrumental) is objectivation, treating the object 
of inquiry as having an existence that is external to and apart from the self. The 
attitude of the actor in normatively regulated rationality (moral=practical) is social 
and norm-conformative, and in dramaturgical rationality (aesthetic-expressive), 
the expression of a free and autonomous subjectivity.34 He suggests that a one-
dimensional application of each model of rational action has correlated in modernity 
with the fragmentation of consciousness into its three domains.
The fragmented, disengaged, and anomic state of contemporary life resulting 
from the splitting apart of rationality leads Habermas to attend to the importance 
of building up communicative praxes in social life for critical reﬂection. At this 
point, it is important to acknowledge Habermas’s fundamental proposal that in the 
world that confronts us—a world whose Enlightened legacies and traditions are 
transparent even in the manners by which we try to quash them, a world where all 
attempts at discovering ultimate foundations for knowledge have broken down—any 
possibility for democratic action and civic discourse depends on a dialectical critical 
theory. To elaborate, Habermas proposes that we conceive of modern societies 
simultaneously as lifeworlds and systems.35 The hermeneutic concept of lifeworlds 
refers to the taken-for-granted universe of daily social living—that storehouse of 
knowledge, tradition, and custom unconsciously passed from one generation to 
next. Language is the dominant medium of the lifeworld, a “culturally transmitted 
and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns.”36 
Systems, on the other hand, are society’s structural features: institutions, 
bureaucracies, administrations, and formal regulations—those organizations 
generally derivative of government and economics. Habermas describes these arenas 
as “speechless” because they do not feature the communicative orientations of the 
lifeworld but are, instead, governed by non-linguistic media—in particular, money 
and power. In modern capitalist societies, he observes, systems and lifeworlds have 
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become polarized by the pervasive application at all levels of society of teleological 
rationality as the mechanism of formal, means-end, instrumental reasoning. The 
resulting “rationalization” of society has been distorted, he believes, by a form of 
rational action used to dominate persons and things rather than as tools for achieving 
cooperative understanding. 
These distortions have forged societies in which systems categories have 
progressively impinged upon the communicative patterns in lifeworlds, which 
continue to diminish against the progressive reach of technology. The “colonization 
of the lifeworld”37 as such has lessened the need for consensus by communicative 
means because disagreements are resolved by established structures of power 
through regulation and law. Simultaneously, the possibilities for autonomy and 
mutual understanding decline with the polarization of lifeworlds from structures 
of decision leading to systematic dehumanization.38 
Another effect of this movement, Habermas says, is the continuing erosion of 
public spheres that allow for a reﬂective critique of controlling actions at the systems 
level. He attributes a progressive erosion of public spheres to the colonization 
of the lifeworld by the apparatuses of systems. The idea of the colonization—or 
“rationalization”—of the lifeworld by systems means that 
it is not the differentiation and independent development of 
cultural value spheres that lead to the cultural impoverishment 
of everyday communicative practice, but an elitist splitting-off 
of expert cultures from contexts of communicative action in 
daily life . . . [and] the penetration of forms of economic and 
administrative rationality into [this realm].39
Habermas concludes that the Enlightenment’s vision of a secular life and 
democratic action, guided by reason, cannot be achieved without attenuating the 
pattern of rationality that methodically deracinates the lifeworld and eviscerates 
the public spheres necessary for deliberative reﬂection. 
To undertake this reversal, he introduces a fourth concept of rationality, that 
of communicative action. By integrating the three-world model of rationality into 
communicative action, Habermas gives hope for the possibility of democratic 
emancipation. In contrast to teleological rationality, which is oriented to reaching 
success by egocentric calculation, communicative rationality aims to achieve 
understanding by uncoerced agreement between actors.40 As a medium of social 
integration expressed in language, communicative action is therefore proper 
to the lifeworld. In the lifeworld, where speakers and listeners are able to refer 
simultaneously to things in the subjective, objective, and social worlds, they can 
subordinate the conduct of systems to decisions made through the open discourse 
of practical and emancipatory communicative action. Habermas derives from 
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hermeneutics the central component of communicative action, that of interpretation. 
Interpretation refers, ﬁrst, to the background lifeworld which informs individual 
perception and, second, to the process involved in negotiating situations which 
admit consensus. For each party in communicative action, “the interpretive task 
consists in incorporating the others’ interpretation into one’s own in such a way 
that in the revised version . . . the divergent situation deﬁnitions can be brought to 
coincide sufﬁciently.”41
So in contrast to the one dimensional applications of teleological, normative, 
and dramaturgical rationalities, communicative rationality aims to achieve 
understanding among participants able to “overcome their merely subjective 
world and . . . assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world, and 
the intersubjectivity of their lifeworlds.”42 Under these circumstances, all have 
equal rights to initiate debate, question, express wishes, feelings and intentions, 
make assertions and recommendations, and challenge justiﬁcations.43 Otherwise, 
for Habermas, such a consensus is prima facie neither genuine nor rational. 
Communicative action as such seeks a practical, intersubjective understanding as 
rational grounds for ethical and political claims traditionally sought in metaphysics 
or religion. 
With communicative action, finally, Habermas points to the possibility 
of subordinating “media-steered” systems to decisions accomplished in open 
communication. Central to this possibility is the securing of a public sphere in the 
lifeworld where practical decisions can be made through collective discussion and 
agreement, in spaces as uninﬂuenced by differential power as possible. Habermas’s 
project is to devise real or virtual public sites where communicative action can 
ﬂourish. For if it can be cultivated in “uncorrupted” spaces in the lifeworld, he 
contends, then democratic action remains an underlying notion in our culture. 
Theatre Curriculum as Communicative Action
For several reasons, educational sites hold opportunities for inquiry, practice, 
and cultivation of what Habermas calls “building up the interactive to coordinate 
actions” in accord with the critical interest.47 First, he asserts that the “rationalization 
of worldviews” occurs in learning processes.48 Second, classrooms and curricula 
in which educational missions are carried out are both interactive and public. 
Third, because learning processes are institutionalized here, colleges are settings 
where system and lifeworld directly interact. The conditions for a communicative 
curriculum comprise, then, a structure for practical and critical reﬂection by fellow 
subjects acting with and among subjects, rather than upon objects—intrinsic to the 
technical interest. The focus is on understanding and reﬂection, the inclusion of 
multiple voices and perspectives, and the development of kinships across cultural 
boundaries. True, forms of coercion at all levels of institutionalized education 
obviously constrain, even prevent, open discourse. But on hermeneutical grounds, 
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Habermas counters that “the lifeworld has to be able to develop insights out of 
itself.”49 So with the aim of constructing a bona ﬁde public space to mediate between 
systems and lifeworlds, I shall hypothesize theatre education, an aesthetic-expressive 
medium, as an apt setting for the realization of communicative action. 
The intrinsically public, interactive, and aesthetic character of theatre and 
performance recommends it as a site for emancipatory communicative action. 
The form that theatrical practice takes is situated in the ongoing tension between 
the creative insights of the self and the generality of afﬁliations we share with a 
community of others. Hence, in the ﬁeld of theatre work, subjective, objective, 
and social actions are all, in varying degrees, in play. As a medium of human 
expression, performance is ritualistic, formal, and public. As such, it is rooted in 
rational social behavior. Like communicative action, theatre is capable of theoretical 
reﬂection on action. Finally, the process of making theatre “coordinates action” in 
face-to-face, social contexts where the possibility always exists for theatre artists 
and spectators to realize a collective agreement. The full process of making theatre 
can occasion an aesthetic dialectical continuum of action and response that usefully 
(not transcendentally) attends to the unpredictable nature of the world. 
Habermas stresses that communicative action occurs in the context of the 
socially constructed lifeworld where persons publicly, and communally, form 
normative judgments. Likewise, theatre can occur in a speciﬁc lifeworld context 
where its multiple participants publicly and interactively form aesthetic and 
critical judgments. (These “agreements” comprise what Habermas calls rational 
communication.) As with communicative action, the illocutionary effects of 
language (verbal and nonverbal) bind participants in a performance event across 
the subjective, objective, and social domains of cognition.
A distinctive feature of theatre curricula as emancipatory action would be 
the promotion of presentational, experiential learning. Certainly, the concept 
of experiential pedagogy is not new, especially in theatre education, which has 
advertised its experiential, “hands-on” advantages since day one. But given our 
Western heritage of linguistic representation—of philosophy over hermeneutics 
and rhetoric, and of foundations over history—genuine experiential learning is 
a radical and elusive project. “Hands-on,” for instance, is not synonymous with 
“experiential.” Duplicating the mimetic, text-led tradition in Western theatre, the 
dominant model for theatre education has ultimately been representational—even 
in “practical” courses like acting, directing, lighting design, and so forth. Lacking a 
theory of praxis, curricula in this vein still reduce the arts and the symbolic universe 
to models for an empirical kind of social, aesthetic, or formal analysis.
From this perspective, we are in a position to ask what uses of communicative 
action inspire as an antidote to the epistemological dichotomy that afﬂicts the 
ﬁeld, frustrating its interest in legitimation. The ﬁrst dispensation typiﬁes what 
I earlier called aesthetically-oriented curricula. The second typiﬁes what I have 
Fall 2007                                                                                                             21
called market-oriented curricula. Both are outcomes of a technical interest that 
brought us to the dead-end of craft vs. culture. But the aesthetically and market-
oriented structures could be fruitfully repaired if subsumed in a civically-oriented, 
communicative interest that would stress knowledge in action, familiarity with 
cultural worlds, and aesthetic conversation across multiple perspectives. A civic 
orientation, through communicative action, would promote understanding of 
cultural forces that shape performance as public phenomena while examining 
the intersections of aesthetic, social, and curricular interests. Lastly, the project 
necessitates a linking with other disciplinary methodologies by which the deﬁnition 
of liberal arts, as we have seen, can be altered. Such a model can be found in that 
of the engaged university—a model that might facilitate theatre’s disciplinary 
legitimacy on the basis of its potential as reﬂexive praxis.
Theatre Studies in the Engaged University
Habermas’s critique of predatory systems in the lifeworld coincides with 
the current notion of the engaged university. This model promotes a more active 
academic relationship with social and natural worlds outside established boundaries 
of institutional traditions and procedures. An engaged epistemology embraces its 
public and communal character and sees intellectual development in curricula that 
stress pragmatic and interdisciplinary approaches to civic involvement.50 Most 
importantly, it has been positioned as a site for an epistemological praxis within 
the context of the emergent corporate and entrepreneurial university.
A core element of the scholarship of academic engagement is its critique of 
academic neutrality on questions of value. It challenges prevailing traditions that 
centralize a teleological acquisition of skills taught by professional experts while 
eschewing understanding and acting within public sites where democratic action 
can be practiced. Consonant with Habermas’s critique of cultural fragmentation, 
it argues, too, that the dominant concept of intellectual growth focuses on value-
neutral analytical reasoning. Carol Geary Schneider characterizes this curriculum as 
fundamentally procedural in that it “interferes in political society only to assure that 
individuals have fair access to a political and economic sphere, with each envisioned 
as open markets of freely competing individuals.”51 The individualistic and 
instrumental nature of this model fails to prepare students to participate critically and 
relationally in ways that will encourage civic and democratic culture, with ethical 
responsibility toward others. Instead, a technicist and procedural dispensation 
implicitly contributes not just to the severance of academic from hermeneutical 
life, but of academic disciplines from each other. Engaged scholarship calls for a 
more direct integration of analytical reasoning with civic affairs where questions 
of ethical value are implicit. Accordingly, curricula should incorporate initiatives 
that strengthen civically-oriented and interdisciplinary inquiry—i.e., projects that 
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bolster interconnectedness between actions in the lifeworld and political life, and 
within disciplinary culture. 
Let us consider in general terms what engaged theatre pedagogy would become 
if it were conceived according to Habermas’s theory. Above all, it would deﬁne 
knowledge as a kind of action, or practice, not as the specialized treatment of things 
to be transmitted, say, from one generation to the next. With this dispensation in 
mind, I suggest three interrelated tenets for a grounded structure from which to 
generate learning practices and activities. The ﬁrst tenet is committed to building 
public communities of learning toward a dialogical and contextual formulation of 
knowledge. In this way, curricula would emphasize understanding and sociation 
over the preparation for careers upon graduation. It would derive from students’ 
symbolic creativity and so would begin with their own experiences and extend 
outward to the world that shapes them. As such, it stipulates that the gulf between 
the student-as-object and the dominating teacher-as-expert be reconstituted as 
an emancipatory relationship of equality and collaboration. A contextualized 
curriculum as such would elevate the importance of non-scripted, student-devised 
texts and performances. “Scripted theatre” is typically concerned with the single 
vision of a playwright, interpreted and staged according to a well-honed production 
hierarchy headed by a director. Non-scripted theatre is distinguished by an emphasis 
on developing new texts and performances in a collaborative process.
The second tenet emphasizes citizenship over skill development. With this 
slant, a curriculum would redirect the individualistic interests typical of theatre 
students to the uses of theatre forms—inside and outside the classroom—that 
speak to public and social issues. This tenet departs from prevailing strategies 
that shape teaching to imperatives of the college theatre production, deﬁning 
theatre not as a building, nor as an accumulation of technological acquisitions and 
methods managed by experts, but as theatre making with the resources needed for 
communicative action: public space, a community of performers, and spectators or 
participants. Above all, aesthetic and moral interests would not be bifurcated into 
two, institutionally governed camps. An important component of the curriculum 
as such would concern the make-up and site of “audiences” and the exploration of 
citizenship in relationship to space. Student-devised performances could function 
in classrooms, black boxes, theatres, and found spaces but would also motivate 
participatory and applied performance methods in theatre making with community 
partners outside the university’s borders. Theatre can play a vital role in forging 
relationships between colleges and living communities, and we can encourage our 
students to discover ways this might happen. 
The third tenet focuses on theatre study as a form of reﬂective engagement 
with public culture and language. With this tenet, a critical dimension would 
aim to buoy students’ capabilities for mediating between lifeworld and systems 
categories. In this orientation, the curriculum would connect original student-based 
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work experimenting with performative conventions, texts, and media with critical 
study of the relationship between performer, mise-en-scène, venue, and audience 
or community partnership. With this approach we ought not neglect the aesthetic 
and ritual ﬁelds of drama, that is, the continuum of comparative theatrical forms. 
Understanding a variety of historical and cultural traditions would open access to 
the widest range of symbolic and performative material, from genre, technique, 
and convention, to performers, texts, authors, and designers, and to artistic and 
intellectual movements. To exile theatre from its histories is to deprive students 
of any living sense of a tradition involving plays, actors, performances, and 
performance forms. 
This curricular framework, then, would harbor a greater appreciation of critical 
theory. The study of theatrical history, literature, and theory would provide for 
analysis of theatrical representation through critical and interpretive languages. For 
this project, we can now draw concepts and vocabularies from performance studies, 
cultural studies, semiotics, psychoanalysis, and feminist and postcolonial theory, 
among others. By examining the continuum of theatrical forms and critical theories, 
students engage in a conversation between tradition and innovation. Inventive 
interpretation of received work changes that work while the process of embodying 
the work changes the student; we reconstitute the past and it reconstitutes us. 
My argument, then, does not advise that we jettison the theatrical and dramatic 
canon and the classical repertoire, or “high art” and the “Western cultural heritage” 
from curricula. Nor is it an attack on the considerable accomplishments of past and 
current theatre educators who have succeeded—often ingeniously and against the 
odds—in legitimizing theatre study in higher education, and making it a signiﬁcant 
force in American theatre. I argue, instead, that theatre history, literature, and 
criticism should not be turned into justifying categories which then dominate 
interpretations seeking evidences. Habermas says,
[T]he project aims at a differentiated relinking of modern culture 
with an everyday praxis that still depends on vital heritages, but 
would be impoverished through mere traditionalism. . . . This 
new connection can only be established under the condition 
that societal modernization will also be steered in a new 
direction.52
To bring about a “relinking,” students would go back and forth between their own 
cultural milieu and received aesthetic traditions in such a way as to illuminate both. 
The process would accentuate theatre’s reﬂexive nature to unveil tacit assumptions 
within social myths and discourses that codify relationships between lifeworlds 
and systems. 
24                                                              Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
Practicing a Communicative and Engaged Pedagogy
Let us recall that what differentiates a communicative curriculum are its 
practices. One approach to a critical aesthetic praxis would be to introduce required 
courses intended to generate a communicative ethos rather than to produce technical 
excellence. Students in these courses would not accumulate skills according to the 
terms of professional expertise, but would participate in theatre making in which 
the “non-specialist” (amateur) has equal access to the production of theatrical 
culture. In these settings, the emergent aesthetic and cultural interests of the 
group would supersede the reproduction of pre-speciﬁed outcomes—for example, 
those of the theatre teacher/director as artistic expert. The teacher would serve 
as a facilitator, integrating theatre forms and other possibilities—ideas, personal 
histories, images, objects, artworks—with students’ social and political concerns 
to instigate theatre projects and to discuss intersections between performance, 
social issues, and community. Existing training of students as actors, designers, 
technicians, and directors, along with innovative study of cross-cultural and cutting 
edge performance forms, would be brought to bear neither for the sole pursuit of 
“art for art’s sake,” nor as the teaching of vocational skills. Instead, performance 
competencies would be geared toward bolstering the theatrical and aesthetic impact 
in the production of community-oriented performances. Finally, as we have seen, 
teachers would provide critical languages for understanding cultural forces that 
give rise to and shape performances as public phenomena.
We can now move to the more speciﬁc problem of designing the theatre course 
as a critical aesthetic praxis in the production of communicative knowledge. There 
is, of course, no all-purpose methodology in any discipline, including theatre 
studies. Pedagogical approaches in what Schneider calls “relational learning” 
include 1) Collaborative Inquiry, 2) Experiential Learning, 3) Integrative Learning, 
4) Project-based Learning, and 5) Service-Learning.53 Teachers are using most of 
these methods in theatre making already. For example, scholars in the ﬁeld once 
called oral interpretation, now performance studies, are expanding the meanings 
of “text” and “performance” to include an array of cultural, oral, aesthetic, and 
social texts. Teachers have adopted theatre-making, integrative strategies that spur 
interest in recreating into presentational performance tropes: community-based oral 
history, ethnographic study, storytelling, and performance of culture, along with 
personal narrative and conversational analysis.54 
In engaged curricula, student-devised, community-based projects and service-
learning, typically elective, would move to the center. A growing interest in 
experiential praxis is reﬂected in numerous case-studies published in a variety of 
journals. In individual courses and extra-curricular projects educators are developing 
student-devised theatre-making forms to discover new dimensions of theatrical 
culture, stage performances in non-theatrical spaces, and conduct site-speciﬁc 
community projects.55 
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A rich area of activity generally undiscovered at the college level lies in the 
ﬁeld of primary and secondary education. Driven since the 1970s by artists and 
teachers in Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, the ﬁeld once called “creative 
dramatics” has evolved into multiple applications including “drama/theatre” as 
social action.56 Jonathan Neelands speaks of “drama/theatre” in order to break with 
the tradition in process drama that designates “drama” and “theatre” as opposing 
terms. He offers, instead, new forms of performance that encompass “the process 
of drama tradition within a broader ﬁeld of theatre which acknowledges both the 
Euro-American performance tradition and other ‘rich traditions’ as well—Noh, 
Kathakali, and Topeng Pagegan.57 English language journals and publications of 
the International Drama Education Association (IDEA) are forums for research 
in applied and participatory theatre making. Active research in Western and non-
Western societies focuses on recent theatre work in identity-formation, social 
justice, and economic equality.58 
The ﬁrst IDEA world congress convened in Brisbane, Australia, in 1995 
and has since become part of an educational paradigm in the making—global in 
scope, intercultural in texture, democratic in style—that promotes theatre studies 
as an agent for transforming self and society. Summarizing the research presented 
at the ﬁrst congress, Neelands outlines the agendas for two themes. For the ﬁrst, 
which addressed cultural action, the agenda was “a) intercultural, multicultural, 
and community theatre, b) intracultural communication through the medium of 
drama/theatre, c) women’s theatre and indigenous theatre, d) oral traditions and 
traditional performing arts in a contemporary context, and e) the inﬂuence of 
Asian culture and theatre forms on contemporary non-Asian theatre.” For the 
second theme, which addressed the needs of young people, the agenda was “a) the 
role of drama/theatre in the ongoing struggle for social justice, human rights, and 
cultural action, b) drama/theatre work with young people in war zones and other 
institutions of threat currently suffered by children, young people, and adults, and 
c) the drama/theatre work that presents positive images of social justice, peace, and 
an ecologically sustainable world to children and young people.”59 
In sum, a civically-oriented pedagogy, embodied in a curricular praxis of 
communicative action, might heal the breach between aesthetically-oriented and 
market-oriented visions. Active participation that is motivated by the practical 
and critical interests would constitute a departure from the kind of participation 
that prevails in technicist curricula which tend to subsume the pedagogical agenda 
within the imperatives of the main-stage college theatre production. Curriculum as 
a critical praxis would change the idea of “getting a show on its feet” to reﬂexive 
theatre making as an agent in democratic action. This idea deﬁnes theatre as an 
aesthetic arrangement of ideas put into practice with the resources needed for a 
communicative curriculum: a public space and students as inventors and participants 
in dialectical critique.
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A coherent theory revisioning the undergraduate theatre curriculum as a public 
site for Habermas’s project would shift formalistic and technicist curricula to an 
emancipatory communicative praxis that stressed active and collaborative learning, 
embraced multi-disciplinary perspectives, and incorporated rationally-based and 
values-based knowledge. Centralizing open, uncoerced conversation would reinstate 
the traditional deﬁnition of liberal education as freedom to think and learn outside 
any structure or dogma. But, in cultivating an aesthetic sensibility that reintegrates 
the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive spheres that 
Habermas identiﬁed, we deﬁne free thinking as inseparable from ethical thinking. 
This viewpoint recommends an exploration of theatre studies that would robustly 
contribute to the formulation of engaged education, legitimize the ﬁeld, and move 
it from the university’s margins to its center.
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